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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
"ExcLusive" JumsDIcoN OF T JUVENILE CotrrTs
The Attorney General of West Virginia, in a recently released
opinion, takes the position that the child welfare provisions of the
West Virginia Code, as amended, do not preclude criminal prose-
cution of juveniles in the circuit courts or other courts having crimi-
nal jurisdiction.1 The importance of the opinion and its possible
effect on the future handling of criminal charges against juveniles
require a close examination of the juvenile court provisions of the
Code and the cases interpreting them.
judicial Perplexity
West Virginia Code c. 49, art. 5, § 3, as amended, relating to
criminal jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, provides:
"Except as to a violation of law which if committed by
an adult would be a capital offense, the juvenile court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal charges
.... against a person who is under eighteen years of age at
the time of the alleged offense."
In State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen2, a case involving a charge of
murder against a fifteen year old defendant, the court wanted to
make it clear that the above provision does not confer criminal
jurisdiction on the juvenile courts. Unfortunately, the syllabus
contains this rather ambiguous statement:
"3. The exclusive jurisdiction granted to the juvenile courts
by Code 49-5-3, as amended, dealing with trials of persons
under eighteen years of age, charged with having committed
criminal offenses, relates only to trials of such persons as to
charges of juvenile delinquency, and not to trials and punish-
ment for criminal offenses."
This part of the syllabus corresponds to a dictum 3 in the opinion
and was not germane to the issues, since the offense with which
Hinkle was charged is a capital one and by clear statutory expression
is in no case subject to the delinquency jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. The uncertainty created by syllabus 3 of the Hinkle case was
heightened by a further dictum in the body of the opinion that "we
1 0 p., Att'y Gen. (W. Va., Feb. 22, 1957). Query: as to what age limits
are intended to be covered by the term "juvenile".
2 128 W. Va. 116, 75 S.E.2d 223 (1953).
3 Id. at 124, 75 S.E.2d 227. "Neither do the statutes attempt to bestow
upon the juvenile courts any criminal jurisdiction. The trial of a juvenile for
delinquency is in no sense a criminal trial."
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need not decide whether a circuit court is precluded from taking juris-
diction in the first instance of an offence other than a capital one."4
The climax came in State ex. rel. Wade v. Skeen,5 where the
court, without dicussion, and relying solely on point 3 of the syl-
labus in the Hinkle case, proclaimed that the circuit court had original
jurisdiction of a charge of burglary, a noncapital offense, against a
person under eighteen years of age. Thus, the simple proposition that
under the statute the juvenile court has no criminal jurisdiction was
transformed to the rather doubtful proposition that the criminal
jurisdiction of the circuit courts is unaffected by the statute, i.e., that
the circuit courts have not lost jurisdiction over persons under eight-
een years of age charged with having committed offenses which
would not be capital offenses if committed by an adult.
The facts in State ex. rei. Wade v. Skeen were somewhat un-
usual. The circuit court wherein the charge was brought was the only
court in that county exercising juvenile jurisdiction.0 It was con-
tended by the defendant that the failure to transfer the case from
the circuit court, as such, to the circuit court as a juvenile court was
a violation of Code c. 49, art. 5, § 3, as amended. The second para-
graph of section 3 provides:
"If during the pendency of a criminal proceeding against
a person in a court other than a juvenile court, it shall be ascer-
tained, or it shall appear, that the person was under the age of
eighteen years at the time of the alleged offense, the court,
judge, or magistrate shall immediately transfer the case with all
the papers, documents, and testimony connected therewith to
the juvenile court having jurisdiction. The juvenile court shall
proceed to hear and dispose of the case in the same manner as
if it had been instituted in that court in the first instance."
The question of a nominal transfer had already been raised and
lightly treated in State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen, where the court said:
"Can the pertinent statutes quoted be construed to mean
that a circuit court having jurisdiction of a criminal case is
required to certify the case to itself as a juvenile court, and
then, as a juvenile court, certify the case back to the circuit
court before a juvenile could be tried for the crime charged?
4 Ibid.
B 140 W. Va. 565, 85 S.E.2d 845 (1955).
6 It is respectfully submitted that the identity of judges in both courts
should not and cannot be reason to disregard the mandate of the statute and
ignore the substantial differences in atmosphere and procedure prevailing in
the juvenile and criminal courts.
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Could any prejudice result to the defendant because of a failure
of a court having jurisdiction of the offense and of the person
to make such certification?" 7
Thus, the court failed to fully respect the mandate in the last
sentence of section 3, quoted above, that "the juvenile court shall
proceed to hear and dispose of the case in the same manner as if
it had been instituted in that court in the first instance." West Vir-
ginia Code c. 49 art. 5, § 14, provides that ".... the court or judge
may after the proceedings, make any of the following dispositions:
"(3) If the child be over sixteen years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense the court may, if the proceed-
ings originated as a criminal proceeding in a court other than
the juvenile court, enter an order transferring the case back
to the court of origin ... "8
It is to be noted that such order retransferring the case may be
made "after the proceedings" in the juvenile court. Failure of the
circuit court to transfer the case would necessarily deprive the
defendant of the hearing provided in the juvenile court. Such hear-
ing may strongly influence the judge in the exercise of his discretion.
Ordinarily some disposition other than retransfer will be made. Of
even greater significance is the fact that the power of the juvenile
court to transfer the case back to the court of origin is granted only
where the child is over the age of sixteen years. Thus, it can readily
be seen that the defendant could be materially prejudiced by a
failure to transfer a proper case to the juvenile court in compliance
with the statute.
In neither State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen nor State ex rel. Wade
v. Skeen did the court consider the mandatory effect of the language
in Code c. 49, art. 5, § 3. Generally the word "shall" when used
in constitutions and statutes leaves no way open for the substitu-
tion of discretion.9 The rule that "shall" should be construed as
mandatory has appropriate application where the provision of the
statute relates to the essence of the thing to be done.10 Here the
requirement that the court "shall immediately transfer the case with
all the papers, documents, and testimony" strongly indicates a man-
7 188 W. Va. 116, 132, 75 S.E.2d 223, 231 (1953).8 Subsection (8) added by amendment. W. Va. Acts 1939, c. 105. (Em-
phasis supplied.)
9 Baer v. Gore, 79 W. Va. 50, 90 S.E. 530 (1916).
10 State ex rel. Boone County Coal Corp. v. Davis, 183 W. Va. 540, 56
S.E.2d 907 (1949). For other tests of whether a statutory provision is manda-
tory, see Note, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 190 (1957).
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datory intent. The provision divests such court of all that is essen-
tial to a determination of the case once it appears that the person
was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the alleged
offense.
It was held in State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen that the right of a
party to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person may
be waived and that the failure of the defendant to inform the court
that he was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense
constituted such waiver. Query, as to the correctness of this hold-
ing. That the defendant is under eighteen years of age is a fact
going to the jurisdiction of the subject-matter and cannot be
waived.1' In State ex rel. Wade v. Skeen, however, there was no
question of waiver. The trial judge knew that the defendant was
under eighteen years of age and the case was a proper one for
transfer under the statute. Yet such transfer was not made, solely
upon the authority of the statement in point 3 of the syllabus in
State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen that the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court relates only to charges of juvenile delinquency, and not to
criminal charges.
Legislative Perplexity
We must now deal with a grave uncertainty which arises out
of the jurisdictional statutes themselves. West Virginia Code c. 49,
art. 1, § 4, provides:
"'Delinquent child' means a person under the age of eight-
een years who:
"(2) Commits an act which if committed by an adult
would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment;
If the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is based on the above
provision of the statute, it could never acquire jurisdiction of a
person who had committed an act which if committed by an adult
would be punishable by life imprisonment. However, if such juris-
diction is based on Code c. 49, art. 5, § 3, it includes all except
11 State ex rel. Shawver v. Casto, 135 W. Va. 797, 68 S.E.2d 673 (1952);
Smith Corp. v. Dailey, 136 W. VA. 880, 67 S.E.2d 522 (1951).
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offenses which if committed by an adult would be capital offenses. 12
The two provisions are clearly in conflict and are irreconcilable.
This is undoubtedly due to an oversight on the part of the legis-
lature. It can be resolved only by the application of principles of
statutory construction.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and
give effect to the intention of the legislature.13 The legislative intent
is not always discernible from the statute itself. The definition
section is not to be overlooked for it is there that the legislature
interprets what is meant by the terms used, and if clear it should be
followed. 14 But that is not an infallible test, for the definitions are
often open to construction. The true legislative intent can be dis-
covered only by factual inquiry into the history of the enactment,
the background circumstances which brought the problem before
the legislature, the legislative committee reports, statements of the
committee chairman, and the course of enactment. 15
A significant statement evidencing legislative intent is found in
the Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Social Security in
West Virginia, 16 submitted to the governor on June 3, 1936. In
regard to the child welfare provisions of the then pending legis-
lation, the report states:
"The jurisdiction of the juvenile courts has been simplified
and extended to give exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal
proceedings against a person under sixteen years of age, except
in cases of capital offense."17
The bill was subsequently enacted without change in the pro-
visions to which the statement pertains. What clearer expression
of legislative intent could be desired? The jurisdiction of the juve-
nile courts is to be "exclusive over all criminal proceedings" against
juveniles, "except in cases of capital offense." The definition of
In a pending case, the juvenile court of Kanawha County took the
position that its jurisdiction was based on the delinquency of the child and
did not include offenses punishable by life imprisonment. The interme-
diate court of the same county insisted that under W. VA. CODE c. 49,
art. 5, § 8, (Michie 1955), charges against persons under eighteen for such
offenses must first be brought in the juvenile court. Op., Arr'Y GEN. (W. VA.,
Feb. 22, 1957).
13 Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953).
14 2 Strn iLA ro, STATuToRY CoNsrucnoN § 8002 (3d ed. 1943).
15 1 id. § 4507.
16 S. Jour., W. Va. Leg., 1st Ex. Sess., 1936, at 18.
17 As originally enacted, the controlling age was sixteen. Increased to
eighteen by amendment, W. Va. Acts 1939, c. 105. (Emphasis supplied.)
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"delinquent child" in Code c. 49, art. 1, § 4, if it is to be construed
as pertaining to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, should be
given the same interpretation.
Constitutionality
Article VIII, § 12 of the West Virginia Constitution provides
that the circuit courts ". . . shall, except in cases confined exclu-
sively by this Constitution to some other tribunal, have original and
general jurisdiction . . . of all crimes and misdemeanors." The
court in State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen noted that if Code c. 49, art.
5, § 8, is to be construed as giving the juvenile courts exclusive juris-
diction to hear and determine criminal charges against juveniles,
except in cases of capital offense, then, we may face the question
whether it violates the above provision of the constitution. In
determining whether the legislature actually intended the juris-
diction of the juvenile court to be exclusive, the history of the
enactments pertaining to the juvenile courts is enlightening. The
first statute with regard to the subject was enacted by Acts 1915,
c. 70. Section 2 of such act provided that the "Circuit and Criminal
Courts... shall have original jurisdiction in all cases coming within
the terms of this act." Section 2 was amended by Acts 1917, c. 63
to read: "Where a court of common pleas or intermediate court
having chancery jurisdiction has been or shall be created, such court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all such cases."
The jurisdiction provisions of the 1931 Code omitted the term
"exclusive". The revisers note to the section I8 states that the pro-
visions were changed to avoid "possible constitutional objections."
Nevertheless, the legislature, in 1936 in the face of these possible
objections, enacted the present provisions, again using the term exclu-
sive with regard to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Consider-
ing the language of the statute, the history of the enactment and
prior enactments on the same subject, and that the legislature is
presumed to have knowledge of all such prior statutes,19 the con-
clusion is unavoidable that the legislature intended the jurisdiction
granted to the juvenile courts to be exclusive. The constitutional
question is thus squarely presented and unless the statute can be
given a construction consistent with the intent of the legislature
which does not interfere with the constitutional jurisdiction of the
circuit courts, it must fail.
1 W. VA. REV. CODE c. 49, art. 2, § 1 (1931).
19 State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 887 (1938).
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The construction placed upon the statute by the court in sylla-
bus 3 of the Hinkle case is not objectionable and is a reasonable
interpretation of it, though lacking much in the way of clarity.
However, the application of that construction in State ex rel. Wade
v. Skeen is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, that is, to
relieve the juvenile of a criminal trial in all but a few well recog-
nized instances2 0 and appears to be a useless sacrifice of a useful
statute. If the juvenile may be proceeded against as an adult in
the circuit court, then a major and primary purpose of the statute
has been defeated. This is unacceptable while there is yet a more
reasonable interpretation.
At common law a person under the age of seven years is con-
clusively presumed to be doli incapax, that is, incapable of the
malice required for the commission of a crime.2 1  As to persons
between the ages of seven and fourteen, this is only a prima facie
conclusion and may be rebutted by a showing that such person is
capable of such malice.22  The idea is expressed in the maxim
"malitia supplet aetatem-malice supplies [the want of] age."2 3 Our
statute, then, amounts to this: the legislature, in the exercise of its
inherent power to change the common law, has moved the common
law presumption from the age group of seven to fourteen, to the
age group of sixteen to eighteen, and has dispensed with the pre-
sumption altogether in capital offenses, which by their very nature
indicate that the juvenile makes up in malice what he lacks in age.
Under this interpretation, an act committed by a person under
eighteen years of age which is not a capital offense, is prima facie
no crime at all. But the act may be a violation of law which, under
Code c. 49, art. 1, § 4, as amended, requires a finding of juvenile
delinquency on the part of such person so as to give the juvenile
court exclusive jurisdiction. The proceeding in the juvenile court
is not a criminal trial and the juvenile is not to be convicted or
punished for his acts.2 4  However, if, after the proceedings, the
juvenile court is of the opinion that the person is doli capax, it may,
if the child is over sixteen years of age, transfer the case back to
the court of origin or other court having criminal jurisdiction for
criminal prosecution. If the child is under the age of sixteen years,
2 0 State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen, 188 W. Va. 116, 124, 75 S.E.2d 228, 227
(1953).21 State ex rel. Cain v. Skeen, 137 W. Va. 806, 74 S.E.2d 413 (1953).
22 Ibid.
23 BLAcK, LAw Dimcorx na (4th ed. 1951) 1111.
24W. VA. GoDn c. 49, art. 7, § 3 (Michie 1955).
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the juvenile court has no power at all to transfer the case back.
Therefore, as to such persons, the presumption of doli incapax is
conclusive. This interpretation does no injustice to either the con-
stitution or the statutory provisions. It is consistent with the court's
interpretation in State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen, and more nearly
approaches the purpose of the legislature in enacting the statutes
relating to child welfare.
Conclusion
Since the proceedings in the juvenile courts are not criminal in
nature and no conviction or punishment may result therefrom, it is
apparent that no criminal jurisdiction was conferred upon the juve-
nile courts. The delinquency jurisdiction of the juvenile courts is
"exclusive", however, in the sense that acts, which under the statute
constitute delinquency, and which formerly were punishable as
crimes, are now prima facie noncriminal and no longer within the
jurisdiction of the circuit and criminal courts, except where the
juvenile court has found that a person above the age of sixteen years
possesses that degree of malice which makes up for his lack of age.
The opinion of the attorney general that criminal charges against
juveniles may be instituted and prosecuted in the criminal courts
is contrary to the law of this state, as evidenced by the constitution,
the pertinent statutes, the principles of the common law and the
expressed intention of the legislature.
L. L. P.
EXTENSION OF LEciSLATVE IN PERSONAm JUBIsDICTION OvER
FOREIGN COB'oR-IToNs
In the past twelve years, a number of leading cases have estab-
lished a substantially new test of legislative jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.' The liberalization began with International Shoe v.
Washington2 which recognized the impracticability of the fictional
consent3 and presence4 doctrines as valid methods of determining
whether or not a state can constitutionally exercise in personam
1 Shutt v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n, 229 F.2d 158 (2d
Cir. 1956); Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 842 U.S. 487 (1952);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 839 U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 810 (1945).
2826 U.S. 810 (1945).
3 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
4 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 284 U.S. 579 (1914).
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